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Abstract
Recent literature on the workhorse model of intra-industry trade
has explored heterogeneous cost structures at the ¯rm level. These
approaches have proven to add realism and predictive power. This
note shows, however, that this added realism also implies that there
may exist a positive bilateral tari® that maximizes national and
world welfare. Applying one of the simplest speci¯cations possible,
namely a symmetric two-country intra-industry trade model with
¯xed export costs that are heterogeneous across ¯rms, we ¯nd that
the reciprocal reduction of small tari®s reduces welfare.
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11 Introduction
Recently ¯rm-level heterogeneity has been introduced to intra-industry trade
models, e.g. Schmitt and Yu (2001), Melitz (2003), Helpman, Melitz and
Yeaple (2004) or Yeaple (2005). These speci¯cations, where ¯rms are het-
erogeneous with respect to their cost structures, have provided important
new insights, frequently reconciling theory with the stylized facts of interna-
tional trade. For example Schmitt and Yu (2001) resolve the puzzle of scale
economies and the volume of intra-industry trade by introducing ¯rm-level
heterogeneous ¯xed exporting costs. Melitz (2003) features ¯rm-level het-
erogeneous marginal costs and analyzes intra-industry reallocations, showing
that additional gains from trade stem from the induced productivity im-
provements. Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) introduce various ¯rm-level
heterogeneities in trading costs and are able to capture the exporting-versus-
FDI decision of ¯rms. Finally, Yeaple (2005) derives ¯rm heterogeneity from
labor force heterogeneities and arrives at realistic predictions concerning the
productivity of exporting ¯rms and the e®ects of trade on the skill premium.
However, thus far the literature has not fully examined the e®ects of these
new { and more realistic { assumptions on the welfare e®ects of trade policies
such as tari®s.1 In this paper, we examine this issue in a simple symmetric
two-county Krugman-type (1980) intra-industry trade model, while introduc-
ing ¯rm-level heterogeneous ¯xed costs of exporting as in Schmitt and Yu
(2001)2 and a bilateral ad valorem tari®. The present model assumes that
all tari® revenues and ¯rm pro¯ts are redistributed in a lump sum fashion to
consumers, that there are no wasteful (e.g. iceberg) trade costs, and that the
¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed costs of exporting are less than the cost of creating a new
variety. We show that in this model there is in fact too much trade in the
free trade equilibrium. More resources are used on the exporting/importing
activity than is welfare-optimal, measured as total consumer utility. Na-
tional and world welfare increases when imposing small bilateral tari®s. The
optimal tari® is strictly positive, less than 1 and increases in the degree of
product di®erentiation (love of variety). Thus, reciprocal trade liberalization,
in particular the reduction of small tari®s, will be welfare-reducing. The un-
derlying mechanism is that even though small bilateral tari®s reduce the
number of traded varieties, the total number of available varieties in both
1Melitz (2003), Falvey, Greenaway and Yu (2004) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004),
examine the welfare e®ects of reducing iceberg and ¯xed export costs in a Melitz-type
(2003) setting with ¯rm-level heterogeneous marginal costs.
2Earlier, Venables (1994) introduced homogeneous ¯xed costs of exporting into an
intra-industry trade model and showed that already this extension of the standard model
commanded additional realism by featuring exporters and non-exporters in equilibrium.
2countries increases. Any tari® reduces the number and volume of traded
varieties. For a small tari® fairly ine±cient exporters cease their trading
activity, and paired with the volume reduction, the total of saved resources
more than compensates consumers via the entry of home varieties. The °ip-
side of this e®ect is of cause, that trading ¯rms, since entry/exit decisions are
based on home market performance, actually make pro¯ts. However, there
is a volume-variety trade-o®. Beyond the optimal tari®, a further increase in
the tari® further reduces the import/export volume of all remaining trading
¯rms and forces fairly e±cient exporters out of the trading activity, replac-
ing cheaply generated varieties (i.e. imported from abroad) with expensively
generated varieties (i.e. produced at home).
The ¯nding of welfare-reducing tari® liberalization contradicts much of
the existing literature, see e.g. Markusen and Venables (1988), Fukushima
and Kim (1989), Lockwood and Wong (2000). Also, in intra-industry trade
models, bilateral tari®s are usually welfare-reducing, e.g. Gros (1987),
J¿rgensen and SchrÄ oder (2005).3 The central di®erence between these models
and the present model is that the earlier work assumes ¯rms to be homo-
geneous in their cost structure. However, Melitz (2003), Falvey, Greenaway
and Yu (2004) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004), all using a Melitz-type (2003)
framework with ¯rm-level heterogeneous marginal costs, examine, inter alia,
iceberg trade cost reductions, which are often interpreted to represent trade
liberalization, and ¯nd, in line with earlier literature, an overall welfare gain.
Furthermore, Melitz (2003) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004) emphasize the
possibility for an anti-variety e®ect. Yet, this situation, in contrast to the
anti-variety e®ect in the present model, only emerges once the ¯xed costs of
exporting are larger than the ¯xed costs of pure domestic production, and
thus the export activity of a ¯rm ties up more resources than an additional
domestic variety would require. This situation is explicitly ruled out in the
present model. The possibility of welfare-reducing trade liberalization is,
however, found in Montagna (2001), in a framework where ¯rms have het-
erogeneous marginal costs. Yet, a welfare loss occurs as a special case when
trade allows relatively ine±cient ¯rms to enter and when consumers' taste
for variety is su±ciently low.
The next section presents the model. In Section 3, we derive the welfare
e®ect of imposing bilateral ad valorem tari®s, and discuss the results. Section
4 concludes.
3The same goes for other bilateral trade barriers such as quotas, real trade costs,
technical barriers, etc; see e.g. Gros (1987), SchrÄ oder (2004). On the other hand, small
unilateral tari®s may increase welfare (Gros, 1987), and unilateral tari®s can induce a home
market e®ect in the presence of transportation costs (Helpman and Krugman, 1989).
32 The Model
The starting point is a standard Krugman-type (1980) model of intra-
industry trade, yet with the feature of ¯rm-level heterogeneous ¯xed costs
of exporting as in Schmitt and Yu (2001). Consumers in two identical coun-
tries, home and foreign, love variety and have identical preferences, in which








i ; µ 2 (0;1) :

















where cd;id is consumption of variant id of non-exported domestic products,
ct;it is consumption of variant it of the exported domestic products and cf;if
is consumption of variant if of imported products.4 The number of variants
actually produced (nd, nt, and nf ) is assumed to be large, although smaller
than Nd, Nt and Nf. Furthermore, denoting foreign variables by ¤, the
symmetry of the setup implies nt = n¤
f = nf = n¤
t and that trade is balanced.
Firms can produce their speci¯c variant for the home market alone or
for both the home and foreign market. The decision to export is ¯rm-
endogenous, where some but not all ¯rms will export. Each ¯rm produces
with the same constant marginal cost ¯ and a ¯xed cost ®, both expressed
in terms of labor, L, which is the only factor of production and is remuner-
ated at the economy-wide wage rate w. When exporting, a ¯rm faces an
additional ¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed export cost, ai, heterogeneous across ¯rms and,
for simplicity, assumed to be uniformly distributed on support ai 2 (0;®),
with F(:) denoting the distribution function. Furthermore, both countries
charge the same ad valorem tari® ¿ 2 (0;1) on imports, i.e. a bilateral tar-
i®. The presence of ¯xed export costs and the tari® creates an asymmetry
between trading and non-trading ¯rms, and hence, the pro¯t functions of a
pure domestic ¯rm only servicing the home market, and an exporting home
¯rm servicing both markets, are
¼d = pdxd ¡ (® + ¯xd)w (3)
¼z = ptxt + (1 ¡ ¿)pzxz ¡ (® + ai + ¯(xt + xz))w ; (4)
4Since all goods enter symmetrically and since all ¯rms behave identically within the
two categories trading and non-trading, we can omit subscript i where unnecessary.
4where xd is the production of a pure domestic ¯rm, and xt and xz are the
output of an exporting ¯rm to the home and the foreign market respectively.
Finally, various market-clearing relations complete the model: labor market
clearing, nd(® + ¯xd) + nt(® + ¯(xt + xz)) +
P
ai = L; goods market clear
Lcd;id = xd;id, Lct;it = xt;it and L¤c¤
f;if = xz;it, where the foreign index if
and the home index it denote one and the same variant; income expenditure
clearing Lw+R = pdxdnd+ptxtnt+pfxfnf, where R denotes the pro¯ts of all
domestic ¯rms and all tari® revenues assumed to be lump-sum redistributed
to consumers; and similar relations for the foreign country.
Non-trading ¯rms
Maximization of (2) leads to the familiar inverse demand functions, e.g. pd =
µcµ¡1
d
¸ for any non-traded home good id, and similar for traded products, given






Given free entry and exit, there are zero pro¯ts for non-trading ¯rms in





In the absence of international trade, the autarky number of ¯rms is de-
















for sales on the home and the foreign market respectively.5 Since pt = pd
consumers do not distinguish between non-traded home products and traded
5Here, we follow Schmitt and Yu (2001), where trading ¯rms reach breakeven on their
home market operation. Di®erent entry decision mechanisms are conceivable, e.g. as in
Melitz (2003) where ¯rms determine their entry subject to some sunk investment.
5home products; and hence, sales of trading ¯rms on their home market must
be:




Sales of home ¯rms on the foreign market { and import sales by foreign
¯rms on the home market { are di®erent. Note that pz =
pd
1¡¿, i.e. exported
goods are more expensive than domestically produced goods and that by
symmetry pz = p¤
z, i.e. the price that a home ¯rm charges abroad is the same
as the price charged by foreign exporters on our home market. In equilibrium,
maximization of utility (2) requires that the ratio of the marginal utility of








z = 1 ¡ ¿.
Utilizing the goods market clearing conditions, this implies
xz = x
¤
z = xd(1 ¡ ¿)
1
1¡µ : (10)
Thus exporting ¯rms charge the same price on their home market and have
the same sales volume as non-trading ¯rms, but charge higher prices and sell
less of their variety on the foreign market. By the same token, domestic con-
sumers pay more and consume less of imported product varieties compared
to domestically produced varieties.
The number of trading and non-trading ¯rms
With the prices and quantities derived above, it is straightforward to identify
the ¯rm just indi®erent between becoming an exporting ¯rm and becoming
a pure domestic ¯rm. This ¯rm is characterized by a ¯xed cost of exporting
¹ a such that it makes zero pro¯ts from the exporting activity. Solving from
(4) for (1 ¡ ¿)pzxz ¡ (¹ a + ¯xz)w = 0, gives
¹ a = ®(1 ¡ ¿)
1
1¡µ : (11)
Notice that by (11) we have ¹ a 2 (0;®), thus the indi®erent ¯rm is within
the assumed range of ai; and all ¯rms i such that ai 2 (0;¹ a) make positive
pro¯ts from exporting, while all ¯rms i such that ai 2 (¹ a;®) are non-trading
¯rms. Furthermore, ¹ a decreases in the tari® rate, implying that the least
e±cient (high ai) ¯rms will cease their trading activity in response to a tari®
increase.
The total number of ¯rms at home, n = nt+nd, is most easily determined
via the labor market clearing condition. Utilizing the fact that the average
¯xed cost of exporting is given by ¹ a=2, and that nt = F(¹ a)n and nd =




2 ¡ 2(1 ¡ ¿)
1
1¡µ






















From (14) it can easily be seen that the total number of ¯rms under trade is
less than the number of ¯rms in autarky, na
d. Yet because of trade, consumers
also have access to foreign varieties, in particular due to symmetry nt = n¤
t =
nf. Furthermore, under free trade (¿ = 0), all ¯rms export and nd in (12)
becomes zero, while with prohibitive trade costs (e.g. ¿ = 1) we are back in
the autarky case, i.e. n in (14) becomes na
d.
3 Welfare results
All tari® revenues and ¯rm pro¯ts are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion
to consumers. Thus total consumer utility is a measure of welfare. Given













¶µ 2 + 2(1 ¡ ¿)
1+µ
1¡µ











in (15) is in fact the value of total consumer utility
under autarky, we have a simple measure of the welfare gain from trade,
namely
b =
2 + 2(1 ¡ ¿)
1+µ
1¡µ




which only depends on ¿ and µ. The following result emerges.
Proposition 1. There exists a strictly positive bilateral tari®, ^ ¿, that maxi-
mizes the national welfare of both countries. In particular, ^ ¿ 2 (0; 1¡µ
2 ).
For proof, see appendix. To illustrate proposition 1, consider ¯gure 1
which plots b as a function of ¿ for various values of µ. To the right, for ¿
close to 1 we are in the autarky situation, b = 1. To the left, for ¿ = 0, we
7are in the free trade situation, and welfare in both countries is clearly above
the autarky level (b > 1). However, imposing a small bilateral tari® increases
welfare until we reach the optimal bilateral tari®, ^ ¿, beyond which welfare
starts to decrease towards the autarky level. What proposition 1 implies is
in fact that there is too much trade in the free trade situation. National and
world welfare increases when imposing small bilateral tari®s. The optimal
bilateral ad valorem tari® is strictly positive, less than 1 and increases in
the degree of product di®erentiation, µ, (love of variety). Accordingly, trade
liberalization, in particular the bilateral reduction of tari®s smaller than ^ ¿,
will be welfare-reducing.










Figure 1: The welfare e®ect of bilateral tari®s
What drives this ¯nding of a welfare-reducing e®ect of trade liberaliza-
tion? To illustrate the intuition for the result it is useful to examine the
number of ¯rms given in (12 ) to (14) and the number of varieties available
on the home market given by ~ n = n + nf. In Figure 2 we have set L = 100,
® = 0:5 and µ = 0:7. What the ¯gure reveals is that with the imposition of
a small bilateral tari®, the exit of trading ¯rms and therewith the loss of nt
and nf is more than compensated by the entry of additional pure domestic
¯rms nd, thus increasing the total number of varieties available, ~ n, and hence
also utility.6
6For formal proof of the shape of ~ n see the appendix.
8To see the logic of the welfare increase stemming from small bilateral
tari®s, consider the following reasoning. A small bilateral tari®, reduces the
number of imported varieties and { via the imposed price increase of foreign
products { the import volume of all remaining varieties. However, overall a
small tari® still increases welfare because the least e±cient exporters are the
¯rst to cease their trading activity. Paired with the additional resources saved
by reducing the trading activity of all remaining exporting ¯rms, this frees
enough resources for the production of more home varieties. The °ip-side of
this e®ect is of cause, that trading ¯rms, since their entry/exit decisions are
based on breakeven on their home market, actually make pro¯ts. Further-
more, there exists a volume-variety trade-o®, that is the tari® reduces the
volume of each remaining importer/exporter but converts it into additional
domestic entry.7 However, beyond the optimal bilateral tari®, ^ ¿, a further
increase in the tari® further cuts imported volumes, and more importantly,
it forces fairly e±cient exporters out of the trading activity. Thus, additional
variants produced relatively cheaply (i.e. by foreign exporters who have fairly
low ¯xed export costs) are replaced with variants produced relatively expen-
sively (i.e. by new home producers incurring the ¯xed production cost, ®).
4 Conclusion
This paper examined the welfare impact of trade policy in an intra-industry
trade model with ¯rm-level heterogeneity. This new type of speci¯cations,
where ¯rms are heterogeneous with respect to their cost structures, has gen-
erated important new insights, frequently reconciling theory with the stylized
facts of international trade, e.g. Schmitt and Yu (2001), Melitz (2003), Help-
man, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) or Yeaple (2005), but has not yet been used
to systematically examine trade policies.
Our model examines bilateral ad valorem tari®s in a symmetric two-
country intra-industry trade model, with ¯rm-level heterogeneous ¯xed costs
of exporting. We ¯nd that in this model there is in fact too much trade in the
free trade equilibrium. More resources are used on the exporting/importing
activity than is welfare-optimal, measured as total consumer utility. There
exists a strictly positive bilateral tari® that maximizes national and world
welfare. Accordingly, trade liberalization, in particular the reciprocal reduc-
tion of small tari®s, is welfare-reducing. This contradicts much { if not all
7The volume-variety trade-o® can be seen by comparing Figure 2, which is plotted
for µ = 0:7 and shows the maximum number of available varieties at a tari® of approxi-
mately 20%, with Figure 1, which shows the welfare maximum for µ = 0:7 at a tari® of
approximately 10%.








70 ~ n = n + nf
total number of varieties available on home market




t = nf, exporting home/foreign ¯rms
Figure 2: The number of ¯rms and varieties with bilateral tari®s
{ of the existing literature. The underlying mechanism for our result is that
even though small bilateral tari®s reduce the number of traded varieties, the
number of available varieties in both countries increases. This mechanism
is at work even though the ¯xed costs of creating a new domestic variety
are always larger than the ¯rm-speci¯c ¯xed costs of exporting and even
though there are no wasteful (e.g. iceberg) trade costs. Future research
should address the welfare e®ects of trade policies for di®erent forms of ¯rm-
level heterogeneity, for di®erent ¯rm-entry decision mechanisms and for more
types of trade barriers.
10A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. A small bilateral tari® increases welfare.




2(1 + µ)(µ ¡ 1 + 2¿(1 ¡ ¿)
2
µ¡1)








2(1 + µ)(1 ¡ µ)
(1 ¡ µ)(1 + µ + 2)2 > 0 : (A.2)





= 0 , µ ¡ 1 + 2¿(1 ¡ ¿)
2
µ¡1 = 0 (A.3)






= 1 ; (A.4)
where g = 1¡µ
2 < 1






K(0) = 0; (A.5)
K(g) = g + 1 > 1; (A.6)
K
0(¿) = 1 + g
1¡g¿
g¡1 > 0 ; 8¿ 2 (0;1) : (A.7)
Therefore, 9 ^ ¿ 2]0;g[ where K(^ ¿) = 1, and thus (A.4) is ful¯lled.
A.2 Proof of the shape of ~ n.
Proof. Number of varieties under free trade is larger than under autarky.
From (14) and (13) the number of varieties available on the home market,




2(1 + (1 ¡ ¿)
1
1¡µ)















Proof. The number of available varieties increases for a small tari®.






(1 + µ) + 2 (1 + µ) (1 ¡ ¿)
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